Language is not merely a tool for communication; it is a social construct that reflects and reproduces existing gender relations. In the context of international legal discourse, linguistic formulation is of paramount importance. Legal texts that establish human rights and define states’ obligations may appear neutral and inclusive on paper, but at their core, they contain hidden gender biases that marginalize women and diminish their presence.
This article examines the mechanisms of gender neutralization in international legal discourse, exploring how language is used to conceal discrimination rather than eliminate it.
The problem of gender linguistics in official discourse manifests itself across several overlapping linguistic levels and is particularly evident in foundational international texts.
First: The Male as the Origin and the Female as an Addendum
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the initial draft of Article 1 began with the phrase “All men are born free…” The word “men” was only replaced with “human beings” or “people” after strenuous diplomatic efforts by women, spearheaded by Hansa Mehta of India and Minerva Bernardino of the Dominican Republic.
However, the final text retained the phrase “brotherhood,” which carries a symbolic, masculine dimension even in the Arabic translation.
Similarly, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 3 states: “The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights,” placing men first both linguistically and sequentially. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights enshrines this same order in its Article 3: “The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all rights.”
Second: Generalized Masculine Pronouns
The English text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a striking example of this type of bias. Article 8 speaks of “the fundamental rights granted to him,” Article 10 of “his rights and obligations,” and Article 11 of “his right to all the guarantees necessary for his defense.” These masculine pronouns, though claimed to be used in a general sense, linguistically and psychologically reinforce a mental image of the legal agent as a man, keeping women outside the realm of legal imagination.
Third: Linguistic Order and Hierarchy
The masculine order is clearly evident in texts that juxtapose “men and women” without reversing the order.
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 states: “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry…”
And in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23 states: “The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry…” This arrangement is not arbitrary; the linguistic narrative reinforces the symbolic primacy of the male and portrays the female as subordinate or secondary.
Fourth: General Terminology That Obscures Gender Experience
Legal formulations rely on abstract terms such as “family,” “individuals,” or “citizens” without naming concrete gender experiences. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers to the “family” as “the natural and fundamental unit of society,” but it fails to name the unequal roles women play within it in many contexts. When phrases like “everyone” or “every person” are used in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they obscure the structural barriers women face—such as gender-based violence or unrecognized reproductive burdens—making the law theoretically applicable to everyone, but in practice benefiting only the group for which it was originally designed.
The Role and Perspective of International Women’s Rights Organizations
International women’s rights organizations, most notably the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the International Organization for Women’s Rights (IOWRD), view gender-blindness as “systemic structural discrimination” that establishes men as the standard of humanity and women as the exception [CEDAW-1979]. These organizations reject the notion of so-called linguistic neutrality and work to address it through:
1. Dismantling patriarchal interpretations:
Highlighting that “gender-blind” laws open the door to narrow judicial interpretations that deny women their rights.
2. Legislative accountability:
Obligating states to review their legal frameworks and amend official terminology to be “gender-inclusive.”
3. Combating cultural resistance:
Training legislators in parliaments to demonstrate that the inclusion of feminine forms (e.g., “citizens” and “female citizens”) protects rights and prevents loopholes.
Conclusion
The marginalization of women in international legal discourse is not merely a linguistic deficiency, but rather a reflection of an authoritarian structure that uses language to maintain the existing social order. Therefore, amending a law here or adding a clause there is insufficient; a fundamental rethinking of the linguistic structure of legal texts is required. This necessitates adopting truly inclusive formulations and employing language that acknowledges gender diversity and calls things by their names instead of concealing them behind a veneer of false neutrality. Legal justice begins with linguistic justice, and just language is that in which women are seen, named, and recognized as agents, not subjects.
Reliable sources and international references:
▪️The major historical document: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
▪️Historical and analytical reference: Glendon, M. A. (2001). A world made new: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Random House.
▪️Civil legal covenant: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
▪️Specialized gender study: Skaar, E. (n.d.). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A gender perspective. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
